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Appellate Practice and Procedure

by Roland F. L. Hall*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys decisions addressing appellate law and procedure
handed down by the Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2005 and
May 31, 2006. The cases discussed fall within three categories: (1)
appellate jurisdiction; (2) preserving the record; and (3) miscellaneous
cases of interest.
II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

A.

Discretionary v. Direct Appeals
Several cases during the survey period dealt with the sometimes
difficult determination of whether discretionary or direct appeal
procedures should be used. In Ladzinske v. Allen,1 the plaintiff-the
owner of property across the street from a school-brought suit against
the defendants-the school, DeKalb County, and related entities-for
mandamus, injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages after the
school obtained a building permit from DeKalb County for construction
of a new building on its property. After the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's claims for mandamus and declaratory relief on the basis of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the plaintiff filed a notice of
direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court.2 The defendants moved to
dismiss the appeal, contending that the plaintiff was required to follow
the discretionary appeal procedures pursuant to section 5-6-35(a)(1) of

* Partner in the law firm of Autry, Horton & Cole, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994); Senior Managing
Editor (1993-1994). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
1. 280 Ga. 264, 626 S.E.2d 83 (2006).
2. Id. at 264, 626 S.E.2d at 84.
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the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), which provides
that all appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions
of state and local agencies must be brought to the supreme court using
the discretionary appeal procedures.4 The supreme court noted that
because the intent of O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(a)(1) was to give the
appellate courts discretion not to accept an appeal where two tribunals
had already adjudicated the case (typically the superior court and the
agency), if a plaintiff was not entitled to become a party to the administrative proceeding, and thus did not have the opportunity to obtain
review from both tribunals, the plaintiff would not be required to follow
the discretionary appeal procedures.5 The plaintiff argued, and the
supreme court agreed, that the plaintiff was not entitled to become a
party to the administrative proceeding at which the building permit was
granted.8 However, because the plaintiff did have the right to appeal
the issuance of the permit but had failed to do so, the supreme court
held that the plaintiff was required to use the discretionary appeal
procedure and was not entitled to file a direct appeal.7 The supreme
court reached this decision even though the superior court dismissed the
plaintiff's appeal on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, rather than ruling on the merits of the plaintiff's claims.8
The supreme court noted that even though it could be argued that two
tribunals had not adjudicated the case, the absence of the second review
on the merits resulted from the plaintiff's decision not to engage in the
administrative process.9
Because the plaintiff failed to use the
discretionary appeal procedure, the supreme court dismissed the
appeal.1"
Using both the discretionary and the direct appeal procedures does not
necessarily ensure success. In Walker v. Estate of Mays," the appellants, a former wife and her children, brought suit against the estate of

3. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (1995).
4. Ladzinske, 280 Ga. at 265, 626 S.E.2d at 84-85.
5. Id., 626 S.E.2d at 85.
6. Id. The facts of this case are thus distinguishable from those of Best Tobacco, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 269 Ga. App. 484, 604 S.E.2d 578 (2004), in which the plaintiff
had the right to initiate an administrative proceeding and engage in the administrative
process but failed to do so. Id. at 485-86, 604 S.E.2d at 579-80. However, the result was
the same. See Roland F. L. Hall, Appellate Practiceand Procedure,57 MERCER L. REV. 35,
36-37 (2005).
7. Ladzinske, 280 Ga. at 266-67, 626 S.E.2d at 85-86.
8. Id. at 266, 626 S.E.2d at 86.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 267, 626 S.E.2d at 86.
11. 279 Ga. 652, 619 S.E.2d 679 (2005).
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the former husband, seeking damages for the former husband's alleged
failure to comply with the requirement in the divorce settlement
agreement that he maintain a life insurance policy naming the wife and
children as beneficiaries. After the trial court granted summary
judgment to the estate, the appellants filed an application for discretionary appeal and a notice of direct appeal with the Georgia Court of
Appeals. The court of appeals denied the application for discretionary
appeal and granted the estate's motion to dismiss the direct appeal on
the basis that the denial of the application for discretionary appeal was
res judicata. 2 The Georgia Supreme Court granted the appellants'
petitions for certiorari as to the denial of the application and dismissal
of the direct appeal and stated that the primary issue on appeal was
whether the appellants were required to comply with the discretionary
appeal requirements.13 The supreme court initially noted that although
the appellants had characterized their claim as an action for breach of
contract, the settlement agreement at issue was incorporated into the
final divorce decree, and thus, whatever claim the appellants had was
founded on the final decree and not on the agreement. 4 On the basis
of O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(a)(2)," which provides that appeals in
"domestic relations cases" must be brought by application for discretionary appeal, the supreme court held that the case concerned domestic
relations and that any appeal had to comply with the discretionary
appeal procedures.' 6
The appellants contended that on at least one prior occasion the
supreme court had transferred a similar case to the court of appeals and
required the court of appeals to adjudicate the case on the merits, even
though the appellants in that case had filed a direct appeal rather than
a discretionary appeal. 7 The supreme court held that although the
court of appeals, in the decision cited by the appellants, did in fact
indicate that it had been instructed to adjudicate the case on the merits,
the observation of the court of appeals was in error because the transfer
order would not have precluded the court of appeals from dismissing the
case if it was a discretionary appeal subject to O.C.G.A. section 5-635(a)(2).' 8 Instead, the case had been transferred simply because the

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
S.E.2d
18.

Id. at 652, 619 S.E.2d at 680.
Id. at 652-53, 619 S.E.2d at 680.
Id. at 653, 619 S.E.2d at 680.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2).
Walker, 279 Ga. at 653, 619 S.E.2d at 680-81.
Id. at 654, 619 S.E.2d at 681 (citing Crotty v. Crotty, 219 Ga. App. 404, 409-10, 465
517, 519 (1995)).
Id.
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supreme court had determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the
particular case.1 9 As the supreme court noted, although all domestic
relations cases fall within the scope of O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(a)(2), the
supreme court only has jurisdiction over domestic relations cases
concerning divorce and alimony.2" Because the appellants' case was a
domestic relations case and the subject matter of the appellants' case did
not concern divorce or alimony, the appeal was subject to the discretionary appeal requirements and did not fall within the supreme court's
jurisdiction. 2' The supreme court expressly disapproved any prior
22
appellate decisions authorizing a direct appeal in such circumstances.
B.

Standing

Several decisions during the survey period dealt with complex issues
of standing and the right to appellate review. In In the Interest of
L. W.,2 the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and
declined to place the children with their maternal grandmother. During
the termination proceedings, the grandmother filed a petition requesting
that the children be placed with her. The grandmother sought and was
refused an opportunity to participate in the termination hearing and was
ultimately found to be an unsuitable placement for the children. 24 The
grandmother appealed, based in part upon the juvenile court's termination of the parental rights of the mother.25 As noted by the Georgia
Court of Appeals, although O.C.G.A. section 15-11-103(a)(1) 26 requires
the juvenile court to attempt to place the child with the grandmother
after the mother's rights are terminated, placement with a relative is not
automatic.2 7 Further, before placing the child, the juvenile court is
required to find that the grandmother meets certain qualifications and
that placement with the grandmother is in the best interest of the
child.28 On the basis of the limited nature of the grandmother's rights,
the court of appeals held that because the grandmother did not have
sufficient rights with regard to the child to be considered a party

19.

Id.

20. Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3(6)).
21. Id. at 655, 619 S.E.2d at 681-82.
22. Id., 619 S.E.2d at 681.
23. 276 Ga. App. 197, 622 S.E.2d 860 (2005).
24. Id. at 204, 622 S.E.2d at 867.
25. Id. at 201, 622 S.E.2d at 865.
26. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-103(a)(1) (2005).
27. L.W., 276 Ga. App. at 201, 622 S.E.2d at 865.
28. Id. at 201-02, 622 S.E.2d at 865.
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"aggrieved" by the orders terminating parental rights,29 the grandmother had no right to appeal from those orders. 0
In Couch v. Parker,"' the appellees owned residential property
adjoining a disposal facility owned by the appellants.32 The appellant,
Carol Couch, the Director of the Environmental Protection Division
CEPD") of the Department of Resources, acting under the authority of
the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act,3 3 caused the EPD to enter
into discussions with the owners of the facility and subsequently issue
consent orders that gave the facility's owners the opportunity to perform
voluntary corrective action.34 The appellees, claiming that they were
adversely affected by the consent orders, requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge ("ALJ") who concluded that the appellees
3 5
lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of the consent order. The
36
ALJ based this conclusion on O.C.G.A. section 12-2-2(c)(3)(B), which
provides that persons are not considered adversely affected by an order
of the Director of the EPD until the Director seeks to enforce the
order.3" Under the ALJ's ruling, the appellees were limited to challenging the enforceability of the orders as entered (at such time as the orders
were enforced by the EPD) and could not challenge the adequacy of the
orders.38
The appellees sought judicial review of the ALJ's ruling from the
superior court, which concluded that O.C.G.A. section 12-2-2(c)(3)(B)
unconstitutionally violated both the appellees' right of access to the court
and their due process rights.39 The supreme court granted the separate
applications for discretionary appeal filed by the Director of the EPD and
4°
After
the facility owners and consolidated the two cases for decision.
the
constitutionregarding
quickly disposing of the appellees' arguments
al right of access to the courts,4' the supreme court went on to address

29. A party is considered to be "aggrieved" by an order or judgment if the order or
judgment "'operates on his rights of property, or bears directly upon his interest.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
30. Id. at 201, 622 S.E.2d at 865.
31. 280 Ga. 580, 630 S.E.2d 364 (2006).
32. Id. at 580, 630 S.E.2d at 365.
33. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-90 to -97 (2006).
34. Couch, 280 Ga. at 580-81, 630 S.E.2d at 365.
35. Id. at 581, 630 S.E.2d at 365.
36. O.C.G.A. § 12-2-2(c)(3)(B) (2006).
37. Couch, 280 Ga. at 581, 630 S.E.2d at 365.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 581-83, 630 S.E.2d at 365-66. The supreme court had previously held that
the Georgia Constitution does not provide any express constitutional right of access to the

26
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the appellees' argument that the limitations on standing imposed by
O.C.G.A. section 12-2-2(c)(3)(B) deprived them of the opportunity to
compel the EPD to consider requiring the facility owners to take
additional remedial measures to remedy the contamination of the
appellees' property.4 2 Although the appellees were entitled to comment
on the proposed terms of the consent orders and suggest additions or
deletions, the appellees also sought the opportunity to obtain administrative review once the consent orders were issued.43 The supreme court
held that the flaw in the appellees' argument was that the legislative
intent behind O.C.G.A. section 12-2-2(c)(3)(B) was in fact to prevent such
attacks on the adequacy of the EPD's consent orders and in doing so, to
avoid delays caused by administrative review and to enable faster
completion of the remedial measures required by the consent order.4 4
Accordingly, the supreme court held that the superior court's reversal of
the ALJ's order was in error.45
In Georgia Departmentof Corrections v. Chatham County,46 Chatham
County (the "County") brought suit against the State of Georgia, the
Georgia Department of Corrections ("DOC"), and the State Board of
Pardons and Paroles ("BPP") to recover costs incurred by the County for
temporarily housing certain state inmates. The trial court dismissed all
of the County's claims against the DOC and BPP except for the County's
request that the two Georgia statutes governing reimbursement of
inmate costs be declared unconstitutional. The DOC and BPP moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the County did not have standing
to bring suit challenging the constitutionality of the statutes and that
the DOT and BPP were in compliance with the challenged statutes. The
County admitted that the DOC and BPP were in compliance with the
statutes, but nonetheless moved for summary judgment, challenging the
constitutionality of the statutes. The trial court denied all of the
summary judgment motions.47
The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the DOC and BPP's application
for interlocutory appeal and held that although the County had standing
to bring suit, its constitutional challenge was not preserved for

courts. See Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condo. Ass'n, 253 Ga. 410, 413, 321 S.E.2d 330, 333
(1984).
42. Couch, 280 Ga. at 583, 630 S.E.2d at 366-67.
43. Id.
44. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 367.
45. Id. at 584, 630 S.E.2d at 367.
46. 274 Ga. App. 865, 619 S.E.2d 373 (2005).
47. Id. at 865-66, 619 S.E.2d at 374. The statutes at issue were O.C.G.A. sections 42-949 (1997) and 42-5-51(c) (1997).
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constitutional review. The reasoning of the court of appeals ran as
follows: (1) the supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
cases questioning the constitutionality of a statute; (2) the supreme court
does not rule on constitutional questions unless it clearly appears in the
record that the trial court distinctly ruled on the point; (3) in the instant
case, the trial court impliedly, rather than explicitly, rejected the
County's constitutional challenge when it denied the County's motion for
summary judgment; and therefore, (4) the constitutional challenge was
neither ripe for review nor in the appropriate forum for review. 49 On
this basis, the court of appeals held that it would neither adjudicate the
County's constitutional challenge nor transfer the case to the Georgia
Supreme Court.5" Also, because the County did not dispute that the
DOC and BPP were in compliance with the statutes, the court of appeals
held that the DOC and BPP's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted.51
Under the court of appeals' analysis, it appears that if the trial court,
in its ruling on the County's motion for summary judgment, had
explicitly addressed the constitutional argument raised by the County,
then the constitutional challenge would have been ripe for review.52 As
to this point, although the court of appeals did recognize that prior cases
suggested that a trial court's implicit denial of a constitutional challenge
should be reviewed, the court of appeals held that "the express ruling
requirement remains the law." 3 It is interesting to compare this
analysis with the supreme court's analysis in a prior case where
constitutional challenges had not been preserved for review because the
trial5 4court "'neither explicitly nor implicitly ruled upon those challenges.'"
Miscellaneous JurisdictionalIssues

C.

55
In Georgia Department of Transportation v. Strickland, a slip and

fall case brought by the plaintiff against the Department of Transportation ("DOT") and the City of Sylvania, Georgia (the "City"), the Georgia
Court of Appeals granted the DOT's application for interlocutory appeal

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

274 Ga. App. at 866, 619 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at 868, 619 S.E.2d at 375-76.
Id., 619 S.E.2d at 376.
Id.
See id. at 868, 868 n.13, 619 S.E.2d at 375-76, 376 n.13.
Id. at 868 n.13, 619 S.E.2d at 375 n.13.
Hindman v. State, 234 Ga. App. 758, 765, 507 S.E.2d 862, 868 (1998).
279 Ga. App. 753, 632 S.E.2d 416 (2006).
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from the trial court's denial of the DOT's motion for summary judgment.56 The City cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for
summary judgment. Because the DOT was required to follow the
interlocutory appeal procedures in bringing its appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the City's cross-appeal should be dismissed on the basis
of its failure to follow those same procedures."
The court of appeals
rejected the plaintiff's argument, holding first that although the City
was a co-defendant, it was also an appellee entitled to file a cross-appeal
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 5-6-38(a), 8 which allows the court of
appeals to consider an interlocutory matter that is the subject of crossappeal, provided that the main appeal is properly before the court of
appeals.59 Second, the court held that the fact that the main appeal
was an interlocutory appeal did not require the City to follow the
60
interlocutory appeal procedures because O.C.G.A. section 5-6-34(d)
allows the court of appeals to consider all judgments, rulings, and orders
rendered in the case, even where the main appeal is taken pursuant to
the interlocutory appeal procedures.6 1 Based on this reasoning, the
court of appeals denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the City's crossappeal."
63
In Walker v. Department of Transportation,
the plaintiffs, landowners and a billboard company, applied to the defendant, DOT, for permits
to place billboards on the landowners' property, which adjoined an
interstate highway. The DOT denied the applications, and the DOT's
action was affirmed by an administrative law judge.' The plaintiffs
petitioned the superior court for judicial review of the DOT's decision
and then entered into a stipulation with the defendant for a future
hearing before the superior court. 5 The superior court ruled that the
DOT's action was affirmed by operation of law pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 32-6-95(c), 6 which provides that if the superior court does not
hear the case within 120 days from the date the petition for review is
filed, the final agency decision is considered affirmed. 7 On appeal, the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 753, 632 S.E.2d at 417.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (1995).
Strickland, 279 Ga. App. at 755-56, 632 S.E.2d at 419.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(d) (1995).
Strickland, 279 Ga. App. at 756, 632 S.E.2d at 419.
Id.
279 Ga. App. 287, 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006).
Id. at 287, 630 S.E.2d at 880.
Id. at 288, 630 S.E.2d at 880.
Id., 630 S.E.2d at 880-81; O.C.G.A. § 32-6-95(c) (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 32-6-95(c).
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plaintiffs contended that the superior court erred in ruling that the
DOT's action was affirmed by operation of law and that it was within
the superior court's discretion to retain jurisdiction on the basis of the
parties' stipulation to a hearing date beyond the 120-day period.68
Based on a prior Georgia Court of Appeals decision 9 interpreting a
similarly worded workers' compensation statute,7 ° the court of appeals
held that because no hearing was scheduled and no ruling was issued
within the 120-day period, the superior court had no jurisdiction to
review the DOT decision, which was affirmed by operation of law
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 32-6-95(c).71
III.

PRESERVING THE RECORD

Even when it appears that issues concerning jury selection have been
plainly raised in the trial court, care must be taken to make the proper
record to preserve such issues for appellate review. For example, in
Wynn v. City of Warner Robins,72 a motor vehicle personal injury case,
a prospective juror stated during voir dire that because of her experience
handling personal injury claims for a railroad, she would require the
plaintiff to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. The plaintiff's
counsel moved to excuse the juror for cause. Upon examination by the
defendant's counsel, the juror stated that she thought she could apply
the preponderance of the evidence standard. The plaintiff's counsel
followed up with further questions and the juror once again stated that
she would apply the reasonable doubt standard. The plaintiff's counsel
once again moved to excuse her for cause. After intervention by the
court, the juror was read the pattern charge on the preponderance
standard, and the juror agreed that she could apply it. The plaintiff's
counsel then asked two final questions, in response to which the juror
promised she could be fair and impartial, and the plaintiff's counsel did
not renew the motion to excuse for cause and did not obtain a ruling
from the court. The juror was selected as a member of the jury, which
returned a verdict for the defense.7 3 On appeal, the plaintiff argued
that the trial court erred in failing to excuse the juror for cause.74 On
the basis of the plaintiff's failure to renew his motion to excuse for cause

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Walker, 279 Ga. App. at 288, 630 S.E.2d at 880-81.
Borden, Inc. v. Holland, 212 Ga. App. 820, 821, 442 S.E.2d 916, 917 (1994).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (2004).
Walker, 279 Ga. App. at 290, 630 S.E.2d at 882.
279 Ga. App. 42, 630 S.E.2d 574 (2006).
Id. at 45-47, 630 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 45, 630 S.E.2d at 578.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

a third time, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed
to preserve the issue for appellate review. 5
Although it is best to raise any claims and defenses early in the case
to ensure appellate review, all hope is not lost for appealing an issue
even when the issue is first raised during summary judgment proceedings or, in certain cases, even when the issue is not directly raised in the
trial court."6 However, when the opposing party is given no opportunity to act on the issue, it is less likely that the issue will be preserved for
review. For example, in Stewart v. Storch,7 the plaintiff-tenant
brought an-action against the defendant, her former landlord, claiming
that the defendant was vicariously liable for sexual harassment
committed by the defendant's husband, who acted as the property
manager for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed from the grant of
summary judgment to the defendant and in addition to raising
arguments concerning vicarious liability, also argued that the defendant
was negligent in permitting the defendant's husband to have contact
with female tenants." The plaintiff did not bring a negligence claim
against the defendant in her pleadings or in response to the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, but first alleged negligence in a
supplemental brief filed three days before summary judgment was
granted to the defendant.79 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that
because the defendant was given no opportunity to move for summary
judgment on any negligence claim and because the negligence claim was
not timely raised by the assertion in the supplemental brief, the court
of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider any negligence claim.8"
In contrast, in Smith v. Henry,8 1 a libel and slander case, the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that it could address the defendant's claim of
privilege even though the trial court did not specifically address the
claim in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment.8 2 The
court of appeals held that because the defendant had raised the issue in
his brief and argued it at the hearing, the trial judge had implicitly
ruled upon the issue by denying the motion. 3

75. Id. at 46-47, 630 S.E.2d at 579.
76. See, e.g., Rouse v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 266 Ga. App. 619, 597
S.E.2d 650 (2004). For an analysis of this remarkable decision, see Roland F. L. Hall,
Appellate Practice and Procedure, 56 MERCER L. REV. 61, 64-66 (2004).
77. 274 Ga. App. 242, 617 S.E.2d 218 (2005).
78. Id. at 247, 617 S.E.2d at 222.
79. Id., 617 S.E.2d at 223.
80. Id. at 247-48, 617 S.E.2d at 223.
81. 276 Ga. App. 831, 625 S.E.2d 93 (2005).
82. Id. at 832, 625 S.E.2d at 95.
83. Id. at 832 n.3, 625 S.E.2d at 95 n.3.
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In Cherokee National Life Insurance Co. v. Eason,8 4 the plaintiff, a
beneficiary under a life insurance policy, brought suit against the
defendant insurance company, claiming wrongful refusal to pay benefits
and seeking attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 13-6-11.8 5 The
jury was instructed on the basis of O.C.G.A. section 13-6-11 that it could
award attorney fees if it found that the defendant's refusal to pay was
in bad faith or if it found that the defendant was being stubbornly
litigious in failing to pay. During the jury's deliberations, the jury sent
a note asking the trial court judge whether the jury was required to find
bad faith on the part of the defendant in refusing to pay the plaintiff in
order to award attorney fees. The trial court judge, after consulting with
the parties' counsel, instructed the jury that it could award attorney fees
on the basis of either bad faith or stubborn litigiousness. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, including an award of attorney fees
on the basis of stubborn litigiousness.8
On appeal, the defendant insurance company contended that because
O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6(a) 7 only provides for an award of attorney fees
against an insurer where the insurer acts in bad faith and because the
jury had not found that the defendant acted in bad faith, the attorney
fees award was unauthorized and subject to reversal.8 8 In essence, the
defendant argued that attorney fees are only permitted in cases against
insurers where there is bad faith and that the general penalty provisions
of O.C.G.A. section 13-6-11 do not apply in such cases.8 9 Although the
Georgia Court of Appeals noted a line of cases supporting the defendant's argument, 9° it held that the defendant had failed to preserve the
issue for appellate review.91 The court of appeals held that the
defendant (1) failed to state its position concerning attorney fees to the
trial court; (2) permitted the verdict form to include the basis of
stubborn litigiousness; and (3) voiced no objection to the jury charge or
the clarification given by the court. 92 The court of appeals held that
the principle that a substantial error in a jury charge may receive
review, even in the absence of objection,93 did not apply because the

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

276 Ga. App. 183, 622 S.E.2d 883 (2005).
Id. at 183, 186, 622 S.E.2d at 884, 886; O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 2006).
Eason, 276 Ga. App. at 184 n.3, 622 S.E.2d at 885 n.3.
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a) (2005).
Eason, 276 Ga. App. at 185, 622 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 185-86, 622 S.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 186 n.6, 622 S.E.2d at 886 n.6.
Id. at 186, 622 S.E.2d at 886.
Id.
See O.C.G.A § 5-5-24(c) (1995).
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defendant made no effort to present its argument to the trial court.94
Further, the court of appeals held that even though the trial court
informed counsel that they could reserve objections to the jury charge
until after the transcript was prepared, the attorney fee issue was not
preserved for appeal because the defendant induced and acquiesced in
the error.95
Failure to comply with appellate procedures, particularly the
procedures for filing transcripts, can have dire consequences for the
appellant. For example, in Adams v. Hebert,9" the appellant's counsel
failed to comply with O.C.G.A. section 5-6-42, 9' which requires the
appellant to file the trial transcript within thirty days of the filing of the
notice of appeal.98 The trial court granted the appellee's motion to
dismiss the appeal. The appellant appealed the dismissal, contending
that the failure of the appellant's counsel to timely file the transcript
occurred because his office staff had failed to correctly enter case
information in the office's case management and docket control system.
The appellant's counsel had also filed an affidavit in response to the
motion to dismiss the appeal, in which counsel stated that he had never
before been late in filing a trial transcript and that the failure to file
was a mere clerical error.9 9 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal
of the appeal, holding that because the appellant's counsel had the
transcript in his possession at the time he filed the notice of appeal,
" °°
there "was nothing to prevent the timely filing of the transcript. l
The court of appeals further held that the failure to timely file the
transcript was unreasonable because the delay in filing the transcript
resulted in the case being placed on a subsequent appellate court
calendar and prejudiced the appellee's ability to administer the estate
at issue. 1 '
In West v. Austin,' ° 2 the defendants appealed from the trial court's
denial of their motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs. 0 3 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that because the
defendants had failed to include a trial transcript in the appellate
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record, it was required to affirm the trial court's ruling.1"4 The
defendants moved for reconsideration of the court of appeals opinion,
claiming that their notice of appeal stated that the 'entire record" was
to be transmitted to the court of appeals.' 5 In response, the court of
appeals stated, "[W]e take this opportunity to remind the bar that such
language is not sufficient to ensure the transmittal of transcripts to this
Court."10 6 On the basis of O.C.G.A. section 5-6-37,1°7 which directs
that the notice of appeal must specifically state whether any transcript
is to be transmitted as part of the record on appeal, the court of appeals
held that it was the appellants' burden to ensure that the trial transcript
was filed and that by failing to designate that transcripts be included in
the appellate record, the appellants had failed to meet this burden.' 8
In Wilson v. 72 Riverside Investments, LLC,l' a the magistrate court
entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 72 Riverside Investments.
The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition to execute the judgment
against the defendant, Wilson, and others in superior court. In its
petition, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant owned pending patent
applications and sought permission to levy on any patents or patent
applications." 0 After a hearing on the plaintiff's petition-at which
the defendant appeared pro se-the superior court ruled that while it did
not have the authority to determine what, if any, patents the defendant
owned, it would enter an order permitting the plaintiff to levy upon
whatever patent rights were owned by the defendant."' On appeal,
the defendant argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter
a ruling on any questions involving patent law.112 The Georgia Court
of Appeals noted that the defendant had not raised the affirmative
defense of subject matter jurisdiction in his answer or in a separate
motion.
This failure was not surprising in light of the defendant's pro
se representation. However, the court of appeals also noted that even
though the defendant and the trial court "discussed at length the fact
that a federal court would have to determine whether [the defendant]
owned the patent applications," because the defendant had "never
questioned the court's jurisdiction to address the issues raised in the
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case," the issue of jurisdiction was not preserved for appeal.'14 Presumably, then, if the defendant had raised the jurisdictional issue during
his colloquy with the trial court during the hearing, he might have
successfully preserved the issue for appellate review.
IV.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ex ParteMotions

In City of Pendergrass v. Skelton,"' the plaintiff, a member of the
National Guard, brought suit against the defendants for, inter alia, false
arrest, battery, and kidnapping. After the plaintiff failed to respond to
the defendants' discovery requests and the defendants moved for
sanctions, the plaintiff moved to stay proceedings pursuant to the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.1 16 Although the plaintiff did not
serve a copy of the motion on the defendants and no certificate of service
was attached, the trial court granted the motion on the day it was filed
and stayed the proceedings. The defendants appealed, contending that
the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion ex parte.1 7 The
Georgia Court of Appeals agreed, citing both Uniform Superior Court
Rule 4.1,118 which prohibits ex parte communications not authorized
by law or by rule, and prior case law establishing that ex parte hearings
are authorized only in the case of extraordinary matters such as
The court of appeals held that
temporary restraining orders.119
because nothing in the record or in the plaintiff's motion established any
basis for concluding that the plaintiff's "legal position would change if
the defendants were served with a copy of the motion and given the
opportunity to respond and appear at the hearing," the granting of the
motion ex parte was in error."' The court of appeals vacated the stay
and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing."'
B.

Sanctions

The court of appeals continues to signal its willingness to penalize
frivolous appeals, even where the appellant is acting pro se and the

114. Id., 626 S.E.2d at 524.
115. 278 Ga. App. 37, 628 S.E.2d 136 (2006).
116. Id. at 37-38, 628 S.E.2d at 137-38; 50 U.S.C. § 522 (2000).
117. Skelton, 278 Ga. App. at 38, 628 S.E.2d at 138.
118. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 4.1.
119. Skelton, 278 Ga. App. at 39, 628 S.E.2d at 138 (citing Biggs v. Heriot, 249 Ga.
App. 461, 462, 549 S.E.2d 131, 132 (2001)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 42, 628 S.E.2d at 140.
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opposing party does not seek sanctions. In Popham v. Garrow,22 the
plaintiff brought suit against several defendants and appealed from the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. 123 The
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the appellant, acting pro se, had
failed to support any of the enumerated errors in his appellate brief with
citations to the record or to legal authority and instead had simply asked
the court of appeals to remand the case for a trial.1 24 The court of
appeals held, sua sponte, that the appeal was frivolous and that
sanctions were appropriate, and the court imposed a penalty of $1000
against the appellant in favor of the appellees pursuant to subsections
(b) and (c) of Court of Appeals Rule 15.125
In Oswell v. Nixon, 26 the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants,
five attorneys, in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendants
represented a party opposing the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged
that in connection with that case, the opposing party had filed a motion
that included a declaration by one of the defendants concerning events
occurring a few days before that defendant was sworn in as a member
of the Georgia Bar. The plaintiff claimed that this action constituted the
unauthorized practice of law and that the other defendants negligently
trained and supervised the defendant giving the declaration. The trial
court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's action and awarded attorney
fees to the defendants 27on the basis that the plaintiff's action was
substantially frivolous.1

On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff's brief
did not contain any citations to the record and that the two-paragraph
128
argument in the plaintiff's brief contained no citations of authority.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that there was no legal
theory under which the plaintiff could be granted the relief he requested,
and the court of appeals proceeded to grant the defendants' motion for
sanctions against the plaintiff and his counsel for filing a frivolous
appeal. 129 After noting that the plaintiff and his counsel had wasted
the resources of the court of appeals and of the defendants, the court of
appeals imposed a penalty in the amount of $1000, to be divided equally
between the plaintiff and his counsel. 3 °
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